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SUICIDE KILLING OF HUMAN LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT
The Continuing Devolution of Assisted Suicide Law
in the United Kingdom
Prof. William Wagner, Prof. John Kane, and Stephen P. Kallman†
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its remarkable history, Great Britain’s culture and law
safeguarded the dignity of human life by refusing to recognize a “right” to
suicide. Indeed, contemporary British statutes make it a serious crime even
to assist in the commission of a suicide killing.1 Recent parliamentary
proposals2 and a court decision,3 however, deliberately abandoned these
deeply-rooted cultural, historical, and legal traditions. Most recently, in an
† Before joining academia, Professor William Wagner served as a Federal Judge in the
United States Courts, as an American Diplomat in the United States government, and as a
Legal Counsel in the United States Senate. Professor Wagner currently holds a permanent
appointment on the tenured faculty at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School where he teaches
Constitutional Law and Ethics. Professor John Kane graduated magna cum laude from the
University of Michigan Law School. He thereafter held a federal judicial clerkship with the
Honorable Deanell Reece Tacha of the United States Court of Appeals. He subsequently
joined the law firm of Honigman, Miller, Schwartz, and Cohn, becoming a percentage
partner. Professor Kane currently holds a permanent appointment on the tenured faculty at
the Thomas M. Cooley Law School where he teaches Property Law and Secured
Transactions. Stephen P. Kallman received his J.D. degree from the Thomas M. Cooley Law
School in May 2011. The authors express appreciation to students Joseph C. Townsend and
Lauren Prieb for their participation in the research and writing of this piece. The worldview
implications of this article have their genesis in the following prior works: Brief for Focus on
the Family and the Family Research Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Ashcroft v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623), 2005 WL 737878; WILLIAM WAGNER,
GARAVENTA CENTER FOR CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL LIFE AND AMERICAN CULTURE, Restoring
the Intrinsic Value of Human Life, in THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18193 (Margaret Monahan Hogan & Lauretta Conklin Frederking eds., 2008); William Wagner,
John S. Kane & Geffrey Gismondi, Physician-Assisted Killing Laws, Constitutional Authority,
and the Conscience of a Nation: Two Worldviews, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 123 (2007).
1. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter Suicide Act].
2. See, e.g., Coroners and Justice Bill, 2008-9, H.L. Bill [96] (Eng.) (Proposed
Amendments 173 & 174, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200809/ldbills/033/amend/ml033-iv.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Coroners
Amendment].
3. R (Purdy) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children
Intervening) [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter
Purdy].
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exercise of raw judicial power, five Law Lords made British history by
declaring into existence a human right to kill human life via suicide.4
Prosecutorial guidelines promulgated pursuant to this court decision by the
Department of Public Prosecutor (DPP), likewise abandoned the deeplyrooted inalienable standard. These guidelines provide prosecutors with
factors they may use to justify a refusal to prosecute someone who assists in
the killing of another human being via suicide. The trend continued with
the formation of a Commission on Death and Dying, which was charged
with studying how the United Kingdom should employ assisted suicide
policy.5
In this article, we analyze the devolution of Britain’s assisted suicide
policy. We begin by reviewing current U.K. statutory law prohibiting
assisted suicide. We then review recent pro-suicide parliamentary proposals
and subsequent court action recognizing suicide as a human right. We also
analyze the DPP guidelines and other relevant contemporary government
actions concerning assisted suicide in the United Kingdom. This critical
review reveals a disquieting jurisprudential shift, accompanied by a
deteriorating respect for the value of human life. Finally, we review the
implications that accompany such a shift in worldviews and how it affects a
nation. In the end, we conclude that viewing the value of human life

4. Id. at 366, 390. Keeping the debate in the global spotlight, two particular doctors,
each known as Dr. Death, publicly pandered their human life termination position
throughout the world. Australian physician Dr. Philip Nitschke founded a right to die
organization and campaigned to legalize euthanasia. Most recently, he brought suicide
workshops to the United Kingdom, where he panders his suicide kits. ‘Dr. Death’ Brings First
Suicide Workshop to UK, THE TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2009, 7:11 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5276368/Dr-Death-brings-firstsuicide-workshop-to-UK.html. The American Dr. Death, Jack Kevorkian, served eight years
on a murder conviction. Kathleen Gray, Kevorkian Paroled: “I’m Not Going to Do It Again,”
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 14, 2006, at A1. Upon his release from prison, Kevorkian
immediately began campaigning for laws authorising assisted suicide. Associated Press,
Kevorkian Released After 8 Years, WASH. POST, June 2, 2007 at A2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/
AR2007060100179.html. Prior to his recent death, Kevorkian further advocated for human
experimentation on individuals committing suicide, as well as for the experimentation on
handicapped infants and incompetent elderly individuals. Jack Kevorkian, The Last
Fearsome Taboo: Medical Aspects of Planned Death, 7 MED. & L. 1, 8-9 (1988). Nitschke,
Kevorkian, and the five Law Lords view the world through a very different lens from those
who oppose this lethal conduct.
5. The Aim of the Commission, COMMISSION ON ASSISTED DYING (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:02
AM), http://commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/the-aim-of-the-commission.
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through the lens of human-centred, morally-relative legal positivism
presents grave implications for the citizens of Great Britain.
PART I.
U.K. LAW ON ASSISTED SUICIDE
Current statutory law prohibiting assisted killing reflects an objective
moral standard present in Great Britain’s divine, natural, and common-law
traditions. Pro-suicide proposals and court decisions, on the other hand,
divorce and discard any moral reference point in the law and replace it with
a human-centred, morally-relative approach to lawmaking.6
When formulating law concerning suicide killing, these two
jurisprudential worldviews collide. Like other nations, the Parliament and
the judiciary in the United Kingdom face a choice. On the one hand, they
may look to the objective moral standard revealed in divine or natural law
as the benchmark and promulgate provisions reflecting that standard.
Alternatively, they may use subjective, morally-relative legal positivism to
create law apart from any objective moral standard of right or wrong.
A. The History and Tradition in Britain of Protecting the Sanctity of Human
Life
For most of British history, the idea that God endows all human beings
with sacred, inalienable rights—including the right to life—was selfevident.7 British citizens, through the law, have historically acknowledged
and respected the God-given, and hence, inviolable dignity of every human

6. Fundamentally, two jurisprudential views of the world exist. The first view sees God
as the source of law and rights, while the latter makes man the measure of all things. Thus,
one can embrace either that law is something God reveals for us to discover or that it is
something we create solely by our own reasoning—apart from any divine revelation. Dan
Crone, Assisted Suicide and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: A Philosophical
Examination of the Majority Opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 31 U.S.F. L.
REV. 399, 422 (1997). See also Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits,
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 259, 260 (2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the
Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 667-69 (1997). For further jurisprudential
worldview discussion, see WILLIAM WAGNER, The Jurisprudential Battle over the Character of
a Nation, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY, (Suri Ratnapala & Gabriel Moens eds., LexisNexis
Butterworths 2d ed. 2011).
7. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776)).
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being.8 This history acknowledges that one of the fundamental roles of a
moral government is to protect human life.9 Thus, in Britain, we
traditionally find divine or natural-law prohibitions on suicide and later see
such traditions embodied in British common and statutory law.10 As we
have noted elsewhere:11
It is no coincidence that Western cultures uniformly
discourage—if not condemn—suicide and those who assist in
it.12 These cultures based their ethical and legal systems on the
Judeo-Christian tradition,13 which teaches that taking human life
8. Id. at 426.
9. See, e.g., Dwight G. Duncan & Peter Lubin, The Use and Abuse of History in
Compassion in Dying, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 177 (1996). Indeed, it has been said
that “[t]he care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only
legitimate object of good government.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, Address to Republican Citizens of
Washington County, Maryland, Assembled at Hagerstown on the 6th Instant, in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1905), available at http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff16.htm. Although government must
also protect liberty, the interest in life is plainly superior. See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 741 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). Life without liberty at least holds the
potential for renewed liberty and other goods, but liberty without life is a nullity. No one has
the “liberty right” to unnaturally terminate one’s life because terminating one’s life is
inherently wrong, and that which is inherently wrong cannot be a right. Although this
proposition is self-validating, Hadley Arkes provides an illuminating discussion of the matter
in his book on this subject. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE 24, 168-73 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986).
10. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see supra notes 1-2; see also Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American
Lawyer: The Ennobling History, Philosophy, and Morality of a Maligned Profession, 22 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 209, 220-30 (2005) (discussing the traditions of English common law in the
American legal system, and its strong reliance on natural and revealed law principles).
11. William Wagner, John S. Kane & Geffrey Gismondi, Physician-Assisted Killing Laws,
Constitutional Authority, and the Conscience of a Nation: Two Worldviews, 24 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 123, 128 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Willard C. Shih, Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and “Fidelity in
Translation,” 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1274 (1995).
13. Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 185. Because of the respect for life imbued by the
Jewish religion, suicide was rare in ancient Judaic culture. Daniel M. Crone, Historical
Attitudes Toward Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 7, 10 (1996) (citing NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE
RIGHT TO LIFE 59 (1964); and M. PABST BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 31 (Prentice-Hall
1982)). Although one historian opines that suicide was generally considered the result of
derangement and thus not punishable in Hebraic culture, it is also reported that suicide
victims and their families were punished by denial of the customary burial rites (though this
would hardly seem exculpatory toward an assistor). Id. (citing NORMAN L. FARBEROW,
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is fundamentally wrong. . . .14 Because God creates human life,
only He can authorize the taking of it—and nowhere in His
Cultural History of Suicide, in SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 4 (Normal L. Farberow ed.,
Univ. Park Press 1975); and JACQUES CHORON, SUICIDE 13-14 (Scribner 1972)).
Hellenistic culture also may have influenced some later Jewish writers to relax their
approbation of the act (e.g., in special circumstances, such as avoiding capture in battle), but
Rabbinic and Talmudic writings after the Jewish exile included prohibitions on suicide and
maintained funeral sanctions. Id. at 10-11 (citing BATTIN, supra note 13, at 32); see also
Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 187. Roman law forbade suicide and, at least under limited
circumstances, forfeited the violator’s personal and real property to the state, so it could not
pass to the offender’s heirs. Crone, supra note 13, at 16 (citing FARBEROW, supra note 13, at
6); see also Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 192-94, 199-200 (highlighting that Roman law
criminalized assisting in suicide, “mercy killing” was deemed murder, and forfeiture
occurred only in limited circumstances).
Early Christian culture eventually came to influence Roman law with the conversion
of the Emperor Constantine. Crone, supra note 13, at 17. Christian doctrine, as most
famously expounded by Augustine and Aquinas, clearly forbade suicide, which, at the very
least, implicitly prohibited assistance in suicide. Id. at 17-22; see also Duncan & Lubin, supra
note 9, at 194-95, 197. Because of the dominant influence Christianity had on Western legal
systems, the Judaic and Roman legal penalties for suicide persisted in Western cultures for
many centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 741. See
generally HAROLD J BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1983); Crone, supra note 13, at 16.
Luther, Calvin, and the majority of influential Reformation Christian scholars
continued the Christian condemnation of suicide, although there were a few Christian
writers in the seventeenth century who questioned the extent to which suicide should be
punished as a culpable act. Crone, supra note 13, at 22-24. Despite these debates, the law in
Western countries continued to prohibit suicide. Id.
14. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. In this regard, God reveals in His Word
that the life He creates has worth, value, and significance. He declares His creation of human
life good: “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male
and female created he them.” Genesis 1:26, 27 (NIV); “God saw all that he had made, and it
was very good.” Genesis 1:31 (NIV). Moreover, God intimately communicates that He has a
plan and purpose for each life He creates: “‘For I know the plans I have for you,’ declares the
LORD . . . .” Jeremiah 29:11 (NIV); “For we are God’s handiwork, created in Christ Jesus to do
good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do.” Ephesians 2:10 (NIV); “For you
created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. . . . Your eyes saw my
unformed body; all the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them
came to be.” Psalm 139:13, 16 (NIV); “For in him all things were created: things in heaven
and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all
things have been created through him and for him.” Colossians 1:16 (NIV); “[E]very one who
is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made.” Isaiah 43:7
(NIV); “The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and
earth . . . . From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth;
and he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.” Acts
17:24, 26 (NIV); “[M]y only aim is to finish the race and complete the task the Lord Jesus has
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Word does He authorize suicide or assisting someone to commit
suicide.15 God’s inviolable standard is expressed in His
command: “Thou shalt not kill.”16
Historically, the United Kingdom never recognized a “right” to suicide—
or assistance in committing suicide by physicians or others.17 On the
contrary, the common law generally viewed suicide as self-murder.18 As
with murder, assisting or attempting suicide were also criminal acts at
common law.19 British common law continued the Judaic and Roman
traditions of ignominious burial 20 and adopted a more expanded version of
given me—the task of testifying to the good news of God’s grace.” Acts 20:24 (NIV) (relating
the words of Paul, just prior to facing humanly unbearable adversity).
15. See Genesis 1:27, 5:1-2, 6:7; Job 27:8; Isaiah 42:5; John 3:36; Revelation 22:19.
16. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; see also Genesis 9:6 (NIV) (indicating that humans
are not to be killed because “in the image of God has God made mankind”). Although the
duty of those created to reverently respect the commands of the Creator is self-evident, it
becomes especially compelling when one reads the commandment not to kill in pari materia
with the First Commandment, “I am the LORD your God . . . . You shall have no other gods
before me.” Exodus 20:2-3 (NIV); Deuteronomy 5:6-7 (NIV), and the greatest
commandment, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with
all your mind.” Matthew 22:37 (NIV).
17. See, e.g., Suicide Act, supra note 1; Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 A.C. 345.
18. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523,
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711
(“[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”).
19. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523,
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295); see also Shih, supra note 12, at 1274.
Interestingly, if the assister provided the assistance prior to the suicide act and was not
present at the time of the act, then the assister escaped prosecution. This is because at
common law an accessory before the fact could not be prosecuted until the government
prosecuted and convicted the principal felon (here the person committing felonious suicide).
Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [6], 1 A.C at 379 (citing R v. Russel, [1832] 1 Moody 356, 168 Eng.
Rep. 1302; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). To rectify this problem Parliament enacted the
Accessories and Abettors Act of 1861. Section 1 of the Act made clear that such an assister
could be “indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if he were a principal
felon.” Id. at [7], 1 A.C. at 379-80 (citing Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c.
98, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Abettors Act]; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). Although a
provision of the Homicide Act of 1957 later mitigated to manslaughter certain factual
circumstances involving a suicide pact, those assisting suicide generally still faced murder
charges. Id. at [8], 1 A.C. at 380 (citing Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 4 (Eng.)
[hereinafter Homicide Act])).
20. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 63-64
(1985) [hereinafter Marzen I].
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the Roman penalty of forfeiting the personalty of one who committed
suicide, although it discontinued the escheat of realty.21
Whether by common law, statute, or both, the American colonies also
generally condemned suicide and essentially continued England’s legal
sanctions.22
When natural-law theory dominated Western legal philosophy,23 judges,
lawyers, and scholars recognized God’s existence and referred to His natural
law as a source of human rights.24 These judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
widely agreed that the common law was an expression of natural or divine
law.25 The highest courts of Western nations cited the writings of Grotius,
Puffendorf, and Vattel—three of Europe’s greatest natural-law scholars.26
21. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, (1823) Russ. & Ry. 523,
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)); see also Marzen I, supra note 20, at 6467; Thomas J. Marzen et al., “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”—Reflections Eleven Years
Later, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 264 (1996) [hereinafter Marzen II]; Duncan & Lubin, supra note
9, at 177.
22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712-13 & n.10; Marzen I, supra note 20, at 63-67.
23. R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights in
the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 403-04 (2007); Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law
Originalism for the Twenty-First Century—A Principle of Judicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 385, 391 (2007).
24. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 404-07; Miller, supra note 10, at 217; see e.g., Romans
1:19-29; Romans 2:14-15. For a lucid discussion of divine law as natural law, see DAVID
VANDRUNEN, A BIBLICAL CASE FOR NATURAL LAW (Acton Inst. 2008) (referencing THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a 2ae Q. 91, art.2; JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE
EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE ROMANS (John Owen trans., William B. Eerdman Publ’g
Co. 1947); DOUGLAS J. MOO, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS 148-51 (William B. Eerdman
Publ’g Co. 1996); A. ANDREW DAS, PAUL, THE LAW, AND THE COVENANT 180-82 (Hendrickson
Publishers 2001)).
25. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 416-18; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2006) (“[T]he Founders expected judges to draw
upon natural law principles as sources of decision in both common law cases and in the
course of interpreting legislative enactments.”); Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of
Law and Legal Education: An Historical Framework—A History of U.S. Legal Education
Phase I: From the Founding of the Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041,
1106-08 (2006); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1038-40 (1994).
26. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 407. David Hume prominently opposed the notion that
suicide should be prohibited as a violation of natural law, arguing that we regularly “violate”
natural law and that is not necessarily negative. See Marzen I, supra note 20, at 35-36.
Hume’s argument was cast, however, mostly in terms of the physical laws of nature and was
based on his assertion that human life had no special sanctity or importance. See id. at 36
(“The life of a man is of no greater importance than that of an oyster.”). Hume cannot,
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Additionally, Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England was
once the “bible” for lawyers and judges,27 characterized suicide as “selfmurder” and “among the highest crimes.”28 Thus, the divine law, natural
law, English common law, and Britain’s statutory law traditions all
historically embody an inviolable, objective standard that killing a human
being by suicide is wrong.
B. Contemporary British Statutory Law: The 1961 Suicide Act
Reflecting the inviolable, objective standard, the United Kingdom
enacted statutory law prohibiting assisted suicide.29 As originally
promulgated, the United Kingdom’s Suicide Act 1961 (“Suicide Act”),
provided that “[a] person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide
of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be liable on
conviction on indictment to imprisonment . . . .”30
On its face, the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects of assisted suicide.
To be sure, like many other governments, the United Kingdom, in the
Suicide Act, dropped criminal sanctions for the person attempting suicide.31

therefore, be said to represent the views of the majority of Western people or legal history,
although more than a few prominent legal scholars have also fallen into that black hole and
called it light. See, e.g., Crone, supra note 6, at 412-15.
27. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 62, 71, 72; Kirk, supra note 25, at 1038 (noting that
Edmund Burke reported that by 1775, nearly as many copies of the Commentary had been
sold in America as in England); Jones, supra note 25, at 1055-57; Kmiec, supra note 23, at
391-92; Miller, supra note 10, at 219.
28. 4
WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
ch.
14,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch14.asp. Indeed, courts sometimes
referred to “self-preservation” as “the first law of nature.” Helmholz, supra note 23, at 409
(quoting various cases).
29. Suicide Act, supra note 1; R (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] UKHL 61,
[2002] 1 A.C. 800 [35] (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter Pretty v. DPP]; see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 (noting that in almost every Western democracy it is a crime to
assist a suicide).
30. Suicide Act, supra note 1, § 2(1). By enacting the Suicide Act 1961, Parliament
displaced the common law offense. See, e.g., Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [25], [2010] 1 A.C. 345,
385. The Coroners and Justice Act amended the language of the Suicide Act so that a person
commits an offense if he or she does an act capable or encouraging or assisting the suicide or
attempted suicide of another person. See Coroners and Justice Bill, 2009, H.L. Bill [96], §§
46-48. (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2001/61.html [hereinafter
Coroners Bill].
31. Suicide Act, supra note 1, § 1. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries,
many governments abolished the penalties for suicide by statutory or constitutional
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It is important to note, however, that neither the United Kingdom nor these
other governments did so because they believed suicide was acceptable.32
Thus, after the United Kingdom statutorily decriminalized suicide, judicial
opinions in the House of Lords described the change as a way to promote
life.33
The provisions of the Suicide Act acknowledged that legitimizing assisted
suicide inherently threatens the most vulnerable among us. Similarly, in
judicial opinions, the House of Lords historically recognized such risks.34
Undeniably, many people in the final stages of life cannot communicate
effectively. Whilst they may have once indicated a preference to avoid endof-life suffering, no-one knows whether, at the time they cannot
communicate, they still desire to extinguish their lives unnaturally.
Additionally, Britain’s statutory proscriptions against assisted suicide
reflect the notion that government-authorized suicide creates a frightening
duty to die. Judicial opinions in the House of Lords also historically
recognized that the elderly might choose suicide, “not from a desire to die

provisions. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-68. How governments treated those who assisted
in suicides is unclear due to a lack of reporting and codification of case law and legislation.
Id. at 70-76 (concluding that in the nineteenth century many governments prohibited
assisted suicide). From a drafting perspective, the wording of the Suicide Act 1961 creates an
interesting point of criminal law. This is because “the offence of aiding and abetting the
suicide of another under section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961 is unique in that the critical act—
suicide—is not itself unlawful, unlike any other aiding and abetting offence.” Purdy, [2009]
UKHL 45 [49], 1 A.C. at 393 (quoting Keir Starmer, Decision on Prosecution – The Death By
Suicide of Daniel James, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/ death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/).
32. Rather, governments came to view the penalties as inappropriate either because they
imposed unjustifiable hardship on the victims’ families or because the act was deemed a
manifestation of mental illness, and thus not punishable. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-100;
Marzen II, supra note 21, at 264-65; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 774.
33. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [106], 1 A.C. at 847-48 (“There were good
reasons for wishing to decriminalise the act [suicide] itself. The removal of the fear of
prosecution and of the stigma was likely to make it easier to deter those who were planning
or attempting suicide. Broadly speaking, it was a measure in favour of saving life . . . .”).
Ironically, in Purdy, Lord Brown turns this underlying policy designed to protect life on its
head by using it to legitimize assisting suicide. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [82], 1 A.C. at 403-04
(“[T]he assistance criminalised by section 2(1) is assistance which those lawfully intent on
suicide may require so as to enable them to fulfil their chosen end.”).
34. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [28], 1 A.C. at 822 (“The Government can see no
basis for permitting assisted suicide. Such a change would be open to abuse and put the lives
of the weak and vulnerable at risk.”) (quoting the Government Response accepting the
recommendation of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics).
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or a willingness to stop living, but from a desire to stop being a burden to
others.”35
C. Pro-Suicide Statutory Proposals: Advocates Unsuccessfully Attempt to
Legalize Assisted Suicide Killings in the United Kingdom
Consistent with Britain’s cultural heritage and legal traditions,
Parliament repeatedly defeated endeavours to undercut the protections
provided in the Suicide Act. To be sure, several members of Parliament
relentlessly sought to shift the political paradigm.36 Lord Joffe, whose selfproclaimed life mission is to promote dying, led the attack.37 In 2002 and
2003, Lord Joffe tried unsuccessfully to legalize assisted suicide by
proposing the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill—later known as the Assisted
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill.38 Parliament again rejected the pro-suicide
proposal in both 2005 and 2006.39
The situation involving British pro-suicide advocate Debbie Purdy
prompted another attempt to pass pro-suicide legislation.40 Diagnosed with
a terminal disease, Purdy wanted to kill herself after the illness progressed
to a certain stage.41 She stated that she could not accomplish the act without
assistance.42 When the time came, she wanted her husband to assist in her
suicide killing by helping her travel to another country where suicide was

35. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [29], 1 A.C. at 823 (“We are also concerned that
vulnerable people—the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed—would feel pressure, whether real
or imagined, to request early death.”) (quoting a report by the House of Lords Select
Committee on Medical Ethics).
36. See Helene Mulholland, A Matter of Life and Death, THE GUARDIAN (October 24,
2005, 7:20 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/oct/24/health.politics1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL], THE PUBLIC WHIP (May 12, 2006,
5:17 PM), http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2006-05-12&number=1&house=
lords.
40. See Aufua Hirsch, Debbie Purdy wins ‘significant legal victory’ on assisted suicide,
The Guardian (July 30, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/
jul/30/debbie-purdy-assisted-suicide-legal-victory; Coroners Amendment, supra note 2.
41. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [17], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 381-82.
42. Id.
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legal.43 While Purdy’s situation gained the limelight, Parliament debated the
Coroners and Justice Bill.44
Consistent with the cultural heritage and legal traditions of the United
Kingdom, members of Parliament originally introduced the Coroners and
Justice Bill to strengthen British anti-assisted suicide law. The provisions
included in the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 clarified that Britain’s
proscription against assisting suicide: 1) extended to those who do not
know the person who wants to die,45 and 2) applied to assisters of attempted
suicides regardless of whether an attempted suicide or suicide occurs.46
Pro-suicide proponents in Parliament, however, attempted to use the
Coroners and Justice Bill as a vehicle to legalize assisted suicide.47 Using
Debbie Purdy’s situation as justification, pro-suicide proponents proposed
various amendments. One amendment, intended to authorize assisted
killing of British citizens in Purdy’s situation, counter-intuitively indicated
that
an individual . . . is not to be treated as capable of encouraging or
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult . . . if . .
. the act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling
or assisting [another adult] to travel to a country or territory in
which assisted dying is lawful . . . .48
This proposed amendment would have codified the government-sanctioned
killing of human life under prescribed conditions.49
Thus, an individual in the United Kingdom could put another human
being on a train, sending that person to another country to be killed. The
proposed amendment cloaked the individual assisting in the killing with

43. Id.
44. Michael Hirst, Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue, [2009] CRIM. L.R.
870 (Eng.); Coroners Bill, supra note 30.
45. Coroners Bill, supra note 30, § 46(1A).
46. Id. § 46(1B).
47. See, e.g., Coroners Amendment, supra note 2.
48. Id.
49. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The act reads, in relevant part:
(1) An act by an individual (“D”) is not to be treated as capable of encouraging
or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult (“T”) if—(a) the
act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling or assisting T to
travel to a country or territory in which assisted dying is lawful . . . .
Id.
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complete immunity. Again, counter-intuitively, the proposed law continued
to protect human life as long as the train did not leave the United Kingdom.
Another amendment proposed putting doctors, serving as coroners, in
the position of authorizing the killing of a human being.50 Upon
“certification from a coroner,” the amendment would have allowed an
individual to assist another in committing suicide if the person wishing to
die was “suffering from a confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which
prevents him from carrying through his own wish to bring his life to a
close.”51
The pro-suicide proposal aggressively challenged long-established ethical
elements of medical practice in the United Kingdom. The British Medical
Association and other respected health care organizations nonetheless
continued to affirm the moral proscription against assisted suicide as the
very foundation of medical ethics.52 The Hippocratic Oath, written during
the fifth to fourth centuries B.C., declares, “I will neither give a deadly drug
to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.”53 Such
a standard is consistent with God’s revealed, inviolable standard reflected in
the common law and other historical and legal traditions of the United
Kingdom.54 Indeed, assisted suicide is entirely irreconcilable with a doctor’s
calling to heal.55 Astonishingly, the pro-suicide proposals before Parliament
failed to provide any ethical standards of implementation or enforcement
mechanisms for compliance by physicians. Not surprisingly, therefore, no
data-collection requirements that might provide some accountability even
existed. Furthermore, despite vague, subjective requirements concerning
the physical and mental state of the patient, no definitional safeguards

50 Id.
51. Id.
52. End of Life Decisions: Views of the BMA, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 4 (2009),
available at http://www.bma.org.uk/images/endlifedecisionsaug2009_tcm41-190116.pdf; see,
e.g., Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656263; accord A.M.A CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, § 2.211 (1996), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page? (prohibiting physician assistance in
assisted suicide or euthanasia).
53. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
INTERPRETATION 6 (Henry E. Sigerist ed, The Johns Hopkins Press 1943).
54. The creation of the Hippocratic Oath in ancient Greek culture has been
foundational in Western medical ethics, and it remains centrally relevant in contemporary
medical practice. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996).
55. Id. at 2.
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existed to protect vulnerable or elderly patients. Moreover, no duty to
discuss other treatment options or palliative care alternatives for pain
management existed anywhere in the proposed statutory scheme.
Thus, with virtually no protection for the most vulnerable of British
citizens, the proposed pro-suicide amendments to the Coroners and Justice
Bill expressly authorized individuals, in prescribed circumstances, to assist
in the suicide killing of a human being.56 Consistent with and informed by
the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in Britain’s legal history and
tradition, a majority of those voting on the pro-suicide provisions voted
against them.57
D. The Purdy Decision: Surrendering Sovereignty and Conscience?
Not long after Parliament rejected pro-suicide amendments to the
Coroners and Justice Bill, a court case initiated by Debbie Purdy came
before five Law Lords. Although the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects
of assisted suicide, Purdy raised the issue as to whether an individual could
assist someone to travel to another country where assisted suicide is legal
and expect to escape prosecution.58 Among other things, Purdy contended
that the assisted suicide prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an
interference with her privacy rights under Article 8(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (“European Convention”).59 Thus, Purdy
asserted that she possessed a human right, grounded in privacy, to decide to

56. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The language of the proposed amendment is as
follows:
Notwithstanding sections 49 to 51, no offence shall have been committed if
assistance is given to a person to commit suicide who is suffering from a
confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which prevents him from carrying
through his own wish to bring his life to a close, if the person has received
certification from a coroner who has investigated the circumstances, and
satisfied himself that it is indeed the free and settled wish of the person that he
brings his life to a close.
Id.
57. See Coroners and Justice Bill—Committee (5th Day)—Assisted Suicide, THE PUBLIC
WHIP (July 7, 2009, 8:03 PM), http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2009-0707&number=1&house=lords; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [58], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 396.
58. See, e.g., Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [18-25, 90-93], 1 A.C. at 382-85, 405-06.
59. Id. at [28], 1 A.C. at 386. The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter
“European Convention”) in paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides: “Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” See also id. at [29],
1 A.C. at 386.

40

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:27

kill herself, and that the statutory proscription against assisting suicide
infringed this right.60
To understand fully the context of Purdy, one must review what
happened beforehand. Prior to Purdy came Pretty v. DPP,61 which involved
a woman who also desired to kill herself with the assistance of her
husband.62 When Pretty reached the House of Lords, the court confirmed
that no right to commit suicide existed in the United Kingdom:
while the 1961 Act abrogated the rule of law whereby it was a
crime for a person to commit . . . suicide, it conferred no right on
anyone to do so. . . . The policy of the law remained firmly
adverse to suicide . . . .63
Moreover, on the issue raised by Mrs. Pretty, the Law Lords held that
Article 8 pertained to protecting personal autonomy while the individual
was alive, but did not confer a right to decide to commit suicide.64
The Pretty case was then heard by the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”), now styled as Pretty v. United Kingdom.65 Turning a blind eye to
the cultural and legal traditions of Great Britain, the ECHR reached a very
different conclusion from the British court. The ECHR concluded that
exercising a choice to kill human life via suicide constituted a human right

60. Id. at [28-31], 1 A.C. at 386-87. She also contended that because the Government
failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution policy for assisted suicide, such interference
violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention, which requires interference
with a right to be “in accordance with the law.” Id.; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2.
In this regard, Purdy contended that without such guidance she lacked enough information
to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a government authority if it arbitrarily
interferes with rights safeguarded by the Convention. Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [28-31], 1 A.C.
at 386-87. The European Convention in paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides: “There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the existence of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law . . . .” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2.
61. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 A.C. 800.
62. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 809; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [71], 1 A.C. at 400.
63. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [35], 1 A.C. at 825; see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (commenting on the common-law tradition of
disapproval toward suicide and assisting suicide).
64. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [61], 1 A.C. at 835; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45
[32], 1 A.C. at 387.
65. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002) [hereinafter “Pretty v. UK”].
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under Article 8(1).66 The ECHR also held that the Suicide Act interfered
with this right.67
With the dichotomy of the Pretty decisions serving as the prologue,
Purdy began its journey through the British courts. The Court of Appeal
faced the issue of whether, under Article 8(1) of the European Convention,
Purdy possessed a human right to decide to kill herself.68 Before deciding
the issues, the Court of Appeal had to first determine whether to follow the
British court precedent or the ECHR precedent. The Court of Appeal
applied the former, confirming that Article 8(1) of the European
Convention conferred no right to commit suicide.69 Purdy appealed the
decision to the House of Lords.
The five Law Lords began by relying upon the ECHR’s analysis in Pretty
to resolve the issues raised by Purdy, rather than standing by their previous
precedent in Pretty v. DPP.70 In so doing, the Law Lords discarded the
deeply-rooted British cultural and legal traditions protecting human life
against suicide killings. In its place, the Law Lords adopted the ECHR’s
construction of Article 8(1) of the European Convention71 holding that the
decision to kill human life via suicide was a human right. Thus, each Law
Lord concluded that Purdy possessed a human right under the European
Convention to decide to kill herself. After the Law Lords held that Purdy
had that human right, it further concluded that the assisted suicide
prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an interference with that right.
Because the Government failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution
policy for assisted suicide, the Law Lords further found that such
interference violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention

66. Id. at 37.
67. Id. at 37-40. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) disagreed with the
British Court, asserting: “The Court is not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an
interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8(1) of the
Convention.” Id. at 37. Given that a right existed, the Court then proceeded to evaluate
whether this interference conformed to the requirements of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the
European Convention. Id. at 37-40. The Court concluded the interference in this instance
was justified. Id. at 39.
68. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387. The Court of Appeal decision is
reported at [2009] EWCA (Civ) 92 (Eng.).
69. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387.
70. Id.
71. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 386. Article 8, paragraph 1 of the European Convention
provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 1.
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because the Government’s interference with the right was not “in
accordance with the law.”72
How could the five Law Lords in Purdy so inconsistently interpret
existing pro-life law given the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in its
nation’s legal history and tradition? The answer lies in understanding the
lens through which they view the world.73 The Law Lords and other assisted
suicide proponents reject the moral absolute of an inviolable standard. In its
place, they employ a human-centred, subjective, morally-relative worldview
of legal positivism. When the five Law Lords deemed the killing of human
life via suicide a human right, they did more than defer to the ECHR. They
shifted a nation’s jurisprudential worldview. Before Purdy, British
jurisprudence saw a moral absolute in the innate, positive value of
vulnerable human life. Judges and lawmakers therefore viewed such life as
worthy of governmental protection and proscribed conduct associated with
assisted suicide killing. The five Law Lords in Purdy, instead, chose to view
the matter through the subjective lens of morally-relative legal positivism,
which enabled them to create law without looking to any moral standard of
right or wrong. Viewed through the subjective lens of moral relativism,
deciding to kill human life via suicide devolves into a matter of personal
autonomy or convenience. Thus, the value of a particular human life in the
United Kingdom now varies with the circumstances.
To completely comprehend the significance of this jurisprudential shift,
it is helpful to analyze the mechanics of the court’s analytical process.
Under traditional notions of the rule of law, government can prohibit
conduct.74 Thus, consistent with an inviolable standard that human life has
72. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [30-31, 40-56], 1 A.C. at 386-87, 390-96. The Court held
that without such guidance, individuals like Mrs. Purdy lacked enough information with
which to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a Government authority if it
arbitrarily interfered with rights safeguarded by the European Convention. Id. The European
Convention, Article 8, paragraph 2 provides: “There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the existence of this right except such as is in accordance with the law . . . .”
Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2); see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [29], 1 A.C. at 386.
73. See Wagner, supra note 6.
74. Herbert W. Titus, The Bible & American Law, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 305, 311 (2008).
Titus’ descriptive analysis of this principle is a good example of the unalienable worldview:
Let us now look at the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We
can all certainly agree that verse four addresses the role of the civil ruler as a
minister of God. In the Greek, he is a deacon of God, he is a servant of God.
Notice carefully that verse four authorizes the civil ruler to wield the sword
against wrong doing. Now, that is a very important first principle: The civil ruler
has authority over conduct. Blackstone reflects this view in his definition of

2011] SUICIDE KILLING OF HUMAN LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT

43

value at all stages, the United Kingdom enacted laws prohibiting a person
from assisting in the commission of a suicide killing. Using the evolving
human-centered, morally-relative approach of legal positivism, the Law
Lords took this prohibited conduct and judicially re-characterized it as an
essential liberty interest cloaked with the status of a “human right”—i.e., a
privacy right of personal autonomy to make end-of-life choices. It was no
accident that the newly-created human right completely contradicted the
inalienable, inviolable standard.75
E. Purdy’s Progeny—Public Prosecution Guidelines
In response to the Law Lords’s discussion in Purdy criticizing the lack of
an offense-specific prosecution policy, Britain’s Director of Public
Prosecution (“Director”) drafted policy guidelines in conformance with the
Law Lords’ decision declaring assisted suicide a human right.76
Unfortunately, the new guidelines create more than a little uncertainty in
the law. The guidelines begin by ostensibly suggesting that Purdy did
nothing to change assisted suicide law in the United Kingdom:
The case of Purdy did not change the law: only Parliament can
change the law on encouraging or assisting suicide.
This policy does not in any way “decriminalize” the offence
of encouraging or assisting suicide. Nothing in this policy can be
taken to amount to an assurance that a person will be immune
from prosecution if he or she does an act that encourages or
assists the suicide or the attempted suicide of another person.77
Nevertheless, the guidelines provide that whether someone who assisted
in suicide will be prosecuted is left to the discretion of the prosecutor:
[t]his was recognised by the House of Lords in the Purdy case
where Lord Hope stated that: “[i]t has long been recognised that
a prosecution does not follow automatically whenever an offence
‘municipal law,’ i.e., the law of civil society, describing it as ‘a rule of civil
conduct.’
Id.
75. For a deeper discussion of the jurisprudential mechanics involved, see Wagner,
supra note 6.
76. Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of
Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Feb. 2010),
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html.
77. Id. at paras. 5-6.
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is believed to have been committed”. . . . He went on to endorse
the approach adopted by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney
General in 1951, when he stated in the House of Commons that:
“[i]t has never been the rule . . . that criminal offences must
automatically be the subject of prosecution.”
Accordingly, where there is sufficient evidence to justify a
prosecution, prosecutors must go on to consider whether a
prosecution is required in the public interest.78
Thus, the once inviolable standard, deeply rooted in the nation’s legal
traditions and reflected in its statutory law, is no more. Instead, the value of
any particular British human life rests in the hands of individual
government prosecutors. In deciding not to protect human life against an
assisted suicide killing, prosecutors now may arbitrarily rely upon
ambiguous provisions in the guidelines to refuse to prosecute. Under the
guideline’s factors:
[a] prosecution is less likely to be required if:
1. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and
informed decision to commit suicide;
2. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion;
3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within
the definition of the offence, were of only minor
encouragement or assistance;
4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking
the course of action which resulted in his or her suicide;
5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined
wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide;
6. the suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and
fully assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances
of the suicide or the attempt and his or her part in providing
encouragement or assistance.79
These factors create colossal excuses allowing for assisted suicide without
fear of prosecution. Attempts to disprove these factors become problematic
because, in the words of Dr. Peter Saunders, “[a]nyone who takes part in an

78. Id. at paras. 36-37.
79. Id. at para. 45.
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assisted suicide is going to claim they were acting out of compassion. The
only witness who really knows will be dead.”80
The Director’s assisted suicide guidelines became effective in February of
2010. Thereafter, prosecutors did not file charges in twenty assisted suicides
committed during 2010.81 According to the Director, many of the cases
involved family members assisting in the suicide.82 The disturbing irony is
that this increase in assisted suicides took place while assisted suicide was
still illegal in Britain.83
As the public debate on assisted suicide continues, it makes sense to
review the national implications that accompany such a jurisprudential
shift.84 In the next section, therefore, we address the implications of turning
down the road of morally-relative legal positivism.
PART II.
TURNING DOWN A DANGEROUS ROAD WITH DARK CONSEQUENCES
Suicide-killing proponents insist that the United Kingdom turn off the
path of self-evident inalienable truth—embodied in its deeply-rooted
natural, common, and positive law traditions—onto a path of legal
positivism. Humankind has travelled down this immorally-relative road
before with tragic consequences. Before the United Kingdom proceeds past
a point of no return regarding its suicide-killing policy, we might consider
whether the consequences are worth the supposed convenience.
Policy positions permitting assistance in suicide killings proceed from a
mistaken premise that, in certain conditions, human life no longer has
positive value or purpose. That presupposition has incalculably grave
implications for every citizen in the United Kingdom. When government
policy relegates the value of life to an immorally-relative individual choice,
no benchmark exists against which to measure right from wrong or good

80. DPP Fails to Charge over 20 Suspected Assisted Suicides, CHRISTIAN CONCERN (Dec.
21, 2010), http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/end-of-life/dpp-fails-to-chargeover-20-suspected-assisted-suicides.
81. Steve Doughty, No Charges in 20 Assisted-Suicide Cases as Public Prosecution is
Accused of Re-Writing Law, MAIL ONLINE (Dec. 15, 2010, 8:41 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1338700/No-charges-20-assisted-suicide-casespublic-prosecutor-accused-rewriting-law.html.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422; see also McConnell, supra note 6, at 667-69.
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from evil. If no moral reference point exists for those governing in the
United Kingdom, then nothing prevents taking human life in other ways, or
for other people in different situations. History reveals terrible costs
associated with such an approach. Once liberated from objective, moral
standards by subjective relativism, the individual is completely subject to
the will of any stronger individual or group; for no moral standard exists to
prevent the imposition of that stronger subject’s “morality.”85 Thus, instead
of leading from the alleged “oppression of tradition” to the freedom it
promises, the morally-relative legal positivist path leads to totalitarian
tyranny.86
Many scholars document that although present proposals protecting
suicide proceed down this dangerous road, these proposals were not the
first steps taken down the perilous path.87 During the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries, eugenics movements advocated for the
elimination of “less valuable” human beings.88 Germany subsequently
legalized voluntary euthanasia.89 Thereafter, the Nazis killed hundreds of
thousands of the mentally ill—all prior to the unspeakable tragedy of the
Holocaust.90 The push to make assisted suicide, or “mercy killing,” a normal
and “compassionate” procedure was happening as early as the 1920s in
Germany.91 This approach transformed the role of a physician from that of
purely a healer to both healer and killer.92 The end result was Auschwitz and
places like it. Dr. Jay Lifton conducted extensive research and interviews of
the Nazi doctors who committed these mass killings.93 Lifton established
that the first step enabling the Nazis’ mass killings was the removal of the
barrier between healing and killing:94 “Medicalization of killing—the
85. HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 31 (2002).
86. See Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 3 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 259, 270-71, 274 (2005). That it may be a tyranny of the majority is no comfort, for
today’s majority may become tomorrow’s minority. See ARKES, supra note 85, at 31.
87. KATHLEEN M. FOLEY & HERBERT HENDIN, THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR
THE RIGHT TO END-OF-LIFE CARE 6-7 (1st ed. 2002).
88. Id. at 6. Thirty American states passed sterilization laws embraced by both
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Id.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 7.
91. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE 46-47 (1st ed. 1986).
92. Id. at 4-5.
93. Id. at 6-12.
94. Id. at 14.
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imagery of killing in the name of healing—was crucial to that terrible step.
At the heart of the Nazi enterprise, then, is the destruction of the boundary
between healing and killing.”95
The question must be asked, how could doctors reconcile the killing of
people with their vow to uphold the Hippocratic Oath? When Dr. Fritz
Klein was asked this question, he answered, “Of course I am a doctor and I
want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a
gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is a gangrenous
appendix in the body of mankind.”96 Because of his morally-relative
worldview, Dr. Klein reached the deluded conclusion that he was upholding
the Hippocratic Oath and serving mankind by slaughtering thousands of
Jews.
The perverted idea that killing a patient is compassionate and therapeutic
first gained traction from the work of two German professors, Karl Binding
and Alfred Hoche.97 In 1920, they published their work entitled “The
Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life.”98 This work postulated that
some people are unworthy of life. Those unworthy of life included not only
the incurably ill, but also many mentally ill and deformed children.99 They
stressed the therapeutic goal of destroying an unworthy life and described it
as “purely a healing treatment” and a “healing work.”100 Hoche insisted the
policy was compassionate and consistent with medical ethics.101 He wrote
that putting people to death “is not to be equated with other types of killing
. . . but [is] an allowable, useful act.”102
Hoche further justified the killing policy by deeming the mentally and
physically ill a tremendous burden for society to bear.103 He concluded:
“single less valuable members have to be abandoned and pushed out.”104 Dr.
Lifton exposed Hoche’s “striking note of medical hubris in insisting that
‘the physician has no doubt about the hundred-percent certainty of correct
selection’ and ‘proven scientific criteria’ to establish the ‘impossibility of
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 46-47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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improvement of a mentally dead person.’”105 In other words, these doctors
thought so highly of their knowledge and skill that they could be certain a
“mentally dead” person will never recover. According to their morallyrelative standard, therefore, no problem existed with destroying that life.
The supposed compassionate killing of mentally or physically “unworthy
lives” eventually evolved into a justification for the slaughter of thousands
of Jews, likewise deemed “unworthy.”106 And so we learn from history
where the path of killing as an accepted medical treatment leads. Hoche’s
and Binding’s justifications validating “compassionate” killing of a patient
are eerily similar to contemporary justifications for assisted suicide.
In the 1940s, euthanasia proponents like Dr. Foster Kennedy advocated,
on eugenics grounds, compulsory euthanasia for retarded children.107 By the
1970s, euthanasia proponents evolved their position to easing the “burden”
of caring for the elderly, and then to easing suffering,108 and now to “liberty
of choice.”
A more recent example of the consequences of legalizing assisted suicide
is found in the Netherlands. There, “safeguards” in the pro-suicide Dutch
law failed to protect Dutch citizens. Evidence revealed that thousands were
killed, including many unreported assisted suicides, that many failed to
follow established guidelines for voluntariness or consultation, and that
many lives were extinguished without consent.109 Where did travelling

105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422.
107. FOLEY & HENDIN, supra note 87, at 6-7.
108. Id. at 8. Remarkably, no suffering requirement exists in the pro-suicide proponents’
proposals that were before Parliament. See Coroners Amendment, supra note 2, at n.2. Nor
do these proposals require anyone to advise the patient of palliative care and hospice options.
Id.
109. FOLEY & HENDIN, supra note 87, at 10. Doctors consistently violated unenforceable
legal restraints on “abuses” of the new “right.” At one point in time, sixty percent of Dutch
assisted-suicide cases went unreported. Id. Most of the unreported cases involved physicians
failing to follow established guidelines for voluntariness or consultation. Id. at 10-11. Worse,
in several thousand cases, physicians ended patients’ lives without the patients’ consent. Id.
at 104. Twenty-five percent of physicians terminated one or more lives without a request. Id.
at 104-05. In a 1995 study, forty percent of the more than 6,000 cases in which physicians
actively intervened to cause death involved no explicit request from the patient. Id. at 105;
see also Zbigniew Zylicz, Palliative Care and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Observations of a
Dutch Physician, in FOLEY & HENDIN, supra note 87, at 122-43. Each major Dutch measure
enacted to control and regulate physician-assisted suicide—including informed consent,
consultation, and reporting—failed, was modified, or was violated. FOLEY & HENDIN, supra
note 87, at 103 (citing CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF
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down the path of euthanasia take the Netherlands? A Dutch healthcare
facility concedes it euthanized newborn infants, and a physician who killed
the disabled babies unapologetically asserts his conduct is proper.110 Thus,
society continues to slouch toward Gomorrah—and at an increasingly faster
pace as it replaces God’s inviolable, moral standard with a morally-relative,
individual convenience.111
What can policymakers in the United Kingdom learn from the
experience of its Western neighbours? One thing is that which United
Kingdom pro-suicide proponents present as a limited right to assisted
suicide will “likely, in effect, [lead to] a much broader licence.”112 The most
recent proponent and activist for legalizing assisted suicide in the United
Kingdom is Lord Falconer.113 Leading a supposedly unbiased Commission
on Death and Dying, Falconer’s commission is studying if and how assisted
suicide policy should be implemented in the United Kingdom.114 The
commission is made up of twelve members, most of whom favor legalized
assisted suicide.115 Nine of the twelve members already work in the field and
support assisted suicide.116 The remaining three on the commission are not
known to oppose assisted suicide.117 The chair of the commission, Lord
THE NETHERLANDS (Free Press 1991)). A more recent report indicated an increased number
of “terminal sedation deaths.” Agnes van der Heide et al., End-of-Life Practices in the
Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1957, 1960 (2007). The report
further documented that “[i]n 2005, the ending of life was not discussed with patients for a
variety of reasons. . . .” Id. More recently, Dr. François Primeau stated, “[i]n 2009, in the
Netherlands, there were 2,636 deaths by euthanasia . . . [and] [t]hey don’t count in this total
the 550 cases of euthanasia without consent, nor the 400 cases of assisted suicide, nor the
20% of euthanasia cases that were not reported, nor the infants that died.” Matthew Cullian
Hoffman, Abuse of Assisted Suicide Laws Inevitable, expert warns Quebec government,
LIFESITENEWS.COM (Feb. 22, 2011, 5:34 PM), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/abuse-ofassisted-suicide-laws-inevitable-expert-warns-quebec-government.
110. Steven Ertelt, Dutch Doctor Who Engages in Euthanasia of Newborns Unapologetic,
LIFE NEWS, (Dec. 27, 2004, 9:00 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/bio623.html.
111. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 173-92 (1st ed. 1996).
112. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 733 (1997).
113. The Aim of the Commission, supra note 5.
114. Id.
115. Peter Saunders, Lord Falconers Commission on Assisted Dying, CHRISTIAN CONCERN
(Dec., 1 2010), http://christianconcern.com/our-concerns/end-of-life/lord-falconer%
E2%80%99s-commission-on-assisted-dying.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Falconer, is a long-time proponent of assisted suicide, campaigning to
legalize assisted suicide in the United Kingdom.118 Far from balanced, Lord
Falconer is using this commission as a vehicle to drive the pro-assisted
suicide policy in the United Kingdom.119 How far down the terrible path we
have trod.
CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of its existence, the United Kingdom’s divine and
natural law traditions embodied God’s sacred standard. That standard
requires us not to assist in the killing of human life He created. Discerning
the truth of this ancient, inviolable benchmark, the common and statutory
law of Britain reflected its moral reference point and prohibited assisted
suicide. In the name of progress, Purdy and its pro-suicide progeny reject
the inviolable standard underlying current statutory proscriptions against
assisted killing. Instead, Purdy and its progeny take the United Kingdom
down the morally-relative road of legal positivism. The grave implications
for a nation that accompany such a choice are historically clear and
profoundly frightening. C.S. Lewis noted,
“We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the
place where you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong
turning, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If we are
on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and
walking back to the right road; and in that case the man who
turns back soonest is the most progressive man.”120
Only by turning around and walking back to the right road will the
United Kingdom ever again find the inherent value of human life worthy of
government protection.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 28 (HarperCollins ed. 2001).

